The Julius Randle Conundrum

Taking a deeper look at the context behind Julius Randle's playoff struggles and why it's been as bad as it has been.

Julius Randle’s struggles in the playoffs are well-documented. There’s no real way around it; the numbers are about as ugly as can be. While Randle was dealing with an ankle injury and a re-aggravation of that same ankle injury, his performance was nowhere near the standard he set in the regular season and added to a troubling track record that he’s amassed.

In 15 career playoff games, Randle is averaging just 17.1 PPG, 9.4 RPG, and 3.7 Ast on 34/28/75 shooting splits, a far cry from the All-NBA numbers he’s put up in the regular season. His TS% was at an abysmal 46% and his TOV% rises in the playoffs. Just about every indication and statistic suggests that Randle’s performance in the playoffs isn’t just subpar, but legitimately detrimental when considering his usage and role on the Knicks.

There are similar parallels when taking a closer look at the three playoff series Randle has played. The Hawks, Cavaliers, and Heat all opted to shade help over on Randle’s isolations, deterring him from the rim and forcing him to settle for jumpers over length. Against the Hawks, De’Andre Hunter was Randle’s primary defender but Atlanta always had Clint Capela shade off whichever Knick center was in the game (Nerlens Noel & Taj Gibson), constantly showing Randle at least two defenders.

Against the Cavaliers, Cleveland opted to put length on Randle, using Evan Mobley as his primary defender. They deployed the same strategy as Atlanta, having Jarrett Allen shade off the Knicks centers (Mitchell Robinson & Isaiah Hartenstein), constantly showing Randle two defenders. To the Knicks’ credit, they were able to offset this by dominating Cleveland on the offensive glass and using their physical advantages to overcome Cleveland’s strategy despite poor shooting.

Against the Heat, Miami deployed one of the best defenders in the league in Bam Adebayo on Randle. Miami did not send as much help as the other two teams did with Adebayo being a more than capable defender 1-on-1, but when they did send help they sent it from Knick wings they dared to shoot. In this case that was Josh Hart and RJ Barrett.

All three playoff opponents during Randle’s tenure helped off non-spacers in Knick lineups to congest the floor on Randle, make him uncomfortable, and force him to make decisions in a crowd. There are numbers that support this.

The chart below shows Randle’s effective field goal percentage (EFG%) with certain players on and certain players off the floor in this year’s postseason. There’s a significant difference in Randle’s efficiency when playing alongside non-spacers and spacers.

If we categorize Robinson, Hart, and Barrett as non-spacers with how opposing teams have defended them in the postseason, we see that Randle’s efficiency dramatically dips to not just below league average, but to depths that are extremely concerning for a team’s second option. When they are off the floor, Randle’s efficiency climbs to about slightly-below league average which is true for most NBA players (stars included) in the playoffs.

If we categorize Hartenstein, Grimes, and Quickley as spacers, we see that Randle’s efficiency takes a sizable jump. Hartenstein, while not being a shooter, does bring spacing with his floater that extends to about the free throw line and is savvy at making himself available by cutting into open space. When Randle was given spacing around him, he scored at a much more respectable level.

A major theme in all three playoff series is that opponents have found success defending Randle by showing early help off these non-spacers and having Randle’s primary defender have the length and/or size and strength to compete in isolation. They’ve found that they can fluster Randle and force him to settle for a shot diet that consists of mostly contested jumpers over length and that showing early help can force Randle to make poor decisions with the ball in his hands.

This also plays a role in his decision-making process. Randle, in his time in New York, has always been a slow processor even in his best seasons. He likes to catch, hold, and survey before making almost all his decisions with the ball. It’s partly why he’s often delayed in making what should be easy swing passes and why he turns down open catch-and-shoot 3PT attempts and opts for one-dribble stepback 3’s instead. He needs time to read what the defenders are doing.

The poor spacing only exacerbates this issue. Randle can’t catch, hold, and survey, when he is playing in a crowd because the floor shrinks. The passing windows get tighter and the margin for error only increases. Every read is much more difficult to see and in turn much more difficult to make.

It’s also why Randle has always thrived in transition and as a roller in the PnR (Other than the fact that he’s also 6’8, 250 lbs). He’s often rolling into space where the decisions are much easier to make. Rolling bigmen are often playing at a numbers advantage, only reading one defender and deciding whether to look to score or who to pass to is a much easier proposition even though it’s on the move. The same goes for playing in transition, where the decision-making tree is much simpler than an isolation attempt in the halfcourt. Randle has always looked his best when he’s making quick decisions.

But in Randle’s three career playoff series, he’s been operating at a numbers disadvantage, seeing multiple defenders as opposing teams scheme to make these non-spacers beat them.

Of the 16 teams in the playoffs, the Knicks ranked 13th in pace. There was very little opportunity for Randle to get out in transition and get easy baskets. A lot of the Knick postseason offense came late in the shot clock, where the shots are more difficult and help is easier to send. Randle does have some fault in playing slow, but the Knicks have always ranked in the bottom five in pace during the regular season in Tom Thibodeau’s tenure.

The addition of Jalen Brunson was supposed to, in theory, make things easier for both Randle and the Knicks, and they did. The Knicks won a playoff series with Randle playing poorly and were just two games away from an Eastern Conference Finals appearance. The burden on Randle was eased and unlike in the series against Atlanta, the Knicks didn’t crater when Randle struggled. In this year’s postseason, Randle had moments, quarters, and even halves of positive play which was a massive improvement over the Atlanta series.

The problem is that the addition of Brunson did not completely resolve the issues that plagued Randle in his first playoff series. Yes, the responsibility for Randle was reduced but the Knicks still have players that teams are comfortable ignoring to send help at Randle. The Knicks are still a very slow-paced team and there is very little experimentation done when it comes to trying new lineup combinations that could possibly unlock different aspects of the roster. The Knick offense is also very stale and isolation heavy. All of these things contribute to Randle’s struggles.

When comparing Randle’s shot diet from the regular season to the postseason this year, it is almost exactly identical. It is notable that Randle held the ball on 19.7% of Randle’s possessions in the postseason for six seconds or longer. That number was just 14.9% in the regular season. This lends credence to the argument that Randle’s decisions were harder in the postseason and as those decisions became more difficult, he held the ball longer trying to make the right decisions. On average, the longer a player holds the ball, the more their efficiency tends to drop. So Randle was taking the same shots he did in the regular season, but took longer to get to those shots.

There is not one singular reason for Randle’s playoff struggles, but a lot of them are correlated and exacerbated by one another. Opposing teams have done a fantastic job of scheming to not only his weaknesses as a player but also the Knick roster’s weaknesses as well.

There are things within Randle’s control that he has done a poor job of handling. His defensive effort has always been inconsistent and has a wide range of outcomes that are usually dependent on who his individual matchup is and if his shot happens to be falling that night. Part of the frustration with Randle is that when he does struggle, the ancillary parts of his game often disappear. It’s something Randle has to find a level of consistency with so that he can provide value even on bad shooting nights.

Randle is a tremendously talented player whose heights are All-NBA level and whose lows can derail an entire season. He admittedly does have a considerable level of volatility as a player but one that in the right context has shown the ability to perform at an elite level over the course of a long NBA season. It has yet to occur in the playoffs for him and questions about whether it ever will are fair, but the context behind his struggles is worth discussing and acknowledging.

Very few players are able to thrive irrespective of their context and those that do are almost impossible to acquire. Randle is one whose context is especially important because it can literally be the difference between an All-NBA season and Randle being a negative asset. It’s also up to the Knicks to decide (at some point) not only whether or not that context is realistic or achievable, but also whether or not that context is even worth achieving.